The global decline of the labor share. by Loukas Karabarbounis et al.
The Global Decline of the Labor Share⇤
Loukas Karabarbounis
University of Chicago and NBER
Brent Neiman
University of Chicago and NBER
June 2013
Abstract
The stability of the labor share of income is a key foundation in macroeconomic
models. We document, however, that the global labor share has significantly declined
since the early 1980s, with the decline occurring within the large majority of countries
and industries. We show that the decrease in the relative price of investment goods,
often attributed to advances in information technology and the computer age, induced
firms to shift away from labor and toward capital. The lower price of investment goods
explains roughly half of the observed decline in the labor share, even when we allow for
other mechanisms influencing factor shares such as increasing profits, capital-augmenting
technology growth, and the changing skill composition of the labor force. We highlight
the implications of this explanation for welfare and macroeconomic dynamics.
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1 Introduction
At least since the work of Kaldor (1957), the stability of the labor share of income has been
a fundamental feature of macroeconomic models, with broad implications for the shape of the
production function, inequality, and macroeconomic dynamics. We document that the global
labor share has declined significantly since the early 1980s, with the decline occurring within
the large majority of countries and industries. We demonstrate how the decline of the labor
share can be explained by the decline in the relative price of investment goods. E ciency gains
in capital producing sectors, often attributed to advances in information technology and the
computer age, induced firms to shift away from labor and toward capital to such a large extent
that the labor share of income declined.
We start by documenting a 5 percentage point decline in the share of global corporate
gross value added paid to labor over the last 35 years. We measure the labor share using
a novel dataset we compile by combining country-specific data posted on the Internet with
sector-level national income accounting data from multilateral organizations obtained digitally
and collected from physical books. Our baseline analyses focus on the labor share within the
corporate sector as this allows us to circumvent important measurement di culties confronted
by most of the labor share literature. As emphasized by Gollin (2002), aggregate labor share
measures are influenced by the methods chosen by national statistical agencies to separate
the labor and capital income earned by entrepreneurs, sole proprietors, and unincorporated
businesses. The corporate labor share is not subject to this imputation. While previous analyses
of U.S. data have sometimes focused on the corporate labor share, we are unaware of other
research focusing on corporate labor shares in such a large sample of countries.
Of the 56 countries with at least 15 years of data between 1975 and 2012, 38 exhibited
downward trends in their labor shares. Of the trend estimates that are statistically significant,
34 are negative while only 9 are positive. We complement our analysis with industry-level data
and show that six of the ten major industries experienced significant labor share declines while
only two experienced the opposite. Most of the global decline in the labor share is attributable
to within-industry changes rather than to changes in industrial composition. The pervasiveness
of the decline in the labor share is even present in regional data for the United States, where
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two-thirds of the states experienced declines over this period.
The decline in the price of investment relative to consumption goods accelerated starting
in the early 1980s. We develop a model that relates the decline in the labor share to this
coincident decline in the relative price of investment goods. The economy produces two final
goods (consumption and investment) using a continuum of intermediate inputs. Technology
di↵erences in the production of final goods cause shifts in the price of investment relative to the
price of consumption goods and a↵ect the rate at which households rent capital to the firms.
Monopolistically competitive firms produce intermediate inputs with capital and labor using
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology and sell their output each period at a
constant markup over marginal cost. Changes in the rental rate of capital induce producers to
change their capital-to-labor ratios and, for non-unitary elasticities of substitution, the shares
of each factor in production costs. Changes in price markups additionally change the shares of
each factor in income.
In our model the labor share will only change in response to shocks that influence the rental
rate of capital, markups, or capital-augmenting technology, with the magnitude of any response
being a function of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and the levels of
the labor share and markups. Given our focus on long-term trends, we treat the data as being
generated from the model’s transition from one steady state to another. Assuming a constant
household discount factor and depreciation rate of capital, changes across steady states in
the rental rate only reflect changes in the relative price of investment. Heterogeneity across
countries in the level or growth of any variable other than the relative price of investment,
markups, or capital-augmenting technology will therefore not matter for long-term trends in
the labor share. This logic argues against the possibility that shocks to other macroeconomic
objects such as labor income taxes or household labor supply are important for explaining the
labor share decline.
To determine the implications of the declining relative price of investment for the labor
share, we use our model to estimate the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
Most prior estimates use time series variation within a country in factor shares and factor
prices to identify the elasticity. By contrast, our estimates are identified from cross-country
variation in trends in rental rates and labor shares. Therefore, our estimates are not influenced
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by the global component of the labor share decline, the object that we intend to explain. Put
di↵erently, even if each individual country experienced a decline in both its relative price of
investment and its labor share, there is nothing in our methodology that prevents us from
associating a global decline in the price of investment with a global increase in the labor share.
The rental rate of capital can be influenced at high frequency by various factors such as
short-run changes in interest rates, adjustment costs, or financial frictions. These factors,
however, are unlikely to have a significant influence on long-run trends in the rental rate,
particularly compared to the relative price of investment goods, which moves proportionately
with the rental rate across steady states of our model. Therefore, our estimates focus on low-
frequency variation and only include countries with at least 15, and as many as 37, years of
data. Rather than having to use more volatile proxies of the rental rate, this allows us to
exploit high quality and widely available data on the relative price of investment.
We start by assuming that capital-augmenting technology growth is orthogonal to the price
of investment shock and that the economy has zero profits. In the data, countries and industries
experiencing larger declines in the relative price of investment also experienced larger labor
share declines. This leads to our baseline estimate of the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor of 1.25. When confronted with the 25 percent decline in the global relative
price of investment that occurred since 1975, our model delivers roughly half of the 5 percentage
point decline in the global labor share.
Next, we allow for the possibility that markups a↵ect our estimated elasticity. Imagine that
markups increased more in countries with larger declines in the relative price of investment.
Even in the Cobb-Douglas case, which features a constant labor share of costs, this would
produce a spurious association between declining labor shares of income and declining prices of
investment. Our baseline procedure would incorrectly estimate an elasticity greater than one.
To address this concern, we use long-term trends in nominal investment rates to approximate
changes in the capital-output ratio and follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) in using this
ratio to calculate capital shares and markups. We find that markups generally increased and
therefore did play a role in the labor share decline. However, when we modify our empirical
framework to take markups into account, the estimated elasticity, and thus the implied contri-
bution of the price of investment to the labor share decline, is essentially unchanged relative
3
to our benchmark results.
Similarly, our elasticity estimate might be biased upward if capital-augmenting technology
growth is greater in countries with larger declines in the relative price of investment. The size
of the bias is a function of the covariance between capital-augmenting technology growth and
changes in the relative price of investment in the cross section of countries. We show that
if the pattern of capital-augmenting technology growth is similar to the pattern of estimated
total factor productivity (TFP) growth, then our estimated elasticity is biased upward by less
than 0.05. Therefore, allowing for capital-augmenting technology growth does not alter our
assessment of the importance of declines in the relative price of investment for the decline in
the labor share.
We also consider the possibility that changes in the skill composition of the labor force
impact our estimates and explanation. We modify the production function to allow for two
types of labor that are di↵erentially substitutable with capital. We use this framework to
estimate the sensitivity of the labor share with respect to the relative price of investment
goods, controlling for changes in the stock of skill relative to the stock of capital. Our results
show that the declining price of investment goods continues to account for roughly half of the
decline in the labor share.
We conclude by using our model to evaluate the aggregate implications of our explanation
for the decline in the labor share. We start by comparing the impact of the observed shock to
the relative price of investment in a standard model with Cobb-Douglas production relative to
our model with CES production and an elasticity of substitution equal to 1.25. Welfare gains
resulting from the shock are nearly a quarter (or 4 percentage points) higher in the CES case.
Next, we compare the consequences of two shocks, a decline in the relative price of investment
and an increase in markups, each of which generates an equal reduction in the labor share. The
di↵erences are stark. A labor share decline due to reductions in the relative price of investment
is associated with large welfare gains. The same labor share decline, but due to increases in
markups, is associated with modest welfare losses.
Our work relates to several strands of literature. First, our findings are consistent with
earlier work by Blanchard (1997), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Jones (2003), and Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (2003) that focuses on the variability of labor shares over the medium run,
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including the large declines seen during the 1980s in Western Europe.1 Harrison (2002) and
Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010) use UN data and are the broadest studies of trends in labor
shares. Harrison (2002) finds a decreasing trend in the labor share of poor countries but an
increasing trend in rich countries for 1960-1997. Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010) estimate a
declining average trend in labor shares using an equally weighted set of 129 countries.
Our results improve and expand upon this related literature. We capture significant move-
ments in the labor share subsequent to 2000, include important non-OECD countries such as
China, and use exchange rates to aggregate across countries and examine the global labor share.
By focusing on the labor share in the corporate sector, rather than the overall labor share, our
results are less subject to measurement problems caused by the imputation of labor earnings in
unincorporated enterprises and by shifts in economic activity across sectors. And importantly,
we o↵er novel evidence tying the decline in the labor share to the decline in the relative price
of investment goods and compare our mechanism to other potential explanations.
Our work relates the decline in labor share to the decline in the relative price of investment
by estimating an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor that exceeds unity.2 As
reviewed in Antras (2004) and Chirinko (2008) among others, there is a large literature esti-
mating this elasticity. Though the range of estimates is very wide, most estimates are below
one.3 As discussed above, an important di↵erence between our approach and that taken by
most papers in the literature is that we estimate the elasticity from cross-sectional variation
using many countries and that, by focusing only on long-run trends, we take advantage of
cross-country variation in the relative price of investment.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature on investment-specific technical change.
1Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argue that deregulation in product and labor markets decreased labor shares
and increased unemployment in Europe in the 1980s. Azmat, Manning, and Van Reenen (2012) explore deregu-
lations in the network industry to further advance this argument.
2As discussed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Jones (2003), a balanced growth path with non-zero factor
shares will only emerge if technology growth is labor-augmenting, regardless of the production function, or if the
production function is Cobb-Douglas, even if technology growth is capital-augmenting. Acemoglu (2003) and Jones
(2005) develop models in which firms choose technical progress to be labor-augmenting along the balanced growth
path. If real wage growth or increases in the capital-to-labor ratio are caused by labor-augmenting technology
growth, there need not be movement in the labor share.
3A notable exception is Du↵y and Papageorgiou (2000). Leon-Ledesma, McAdam, and Willman (2010) at-
tribute some of the large variation in the estimates of the elasticity to the use of a single equation first-order
condition rather than a joint estimation with the production function. Data limitations prevent us from employ-
ing their methodology. We note that they find a large downward bias in estimated elasticities from simulated
time-series when the true underlying elasticity is greater than one.
5
Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu↵man (1988), and consistent with Hsieh and Klenow
(2007), we interpret innovations in the relative price of investment as reflecting investment-
specific technology shocks. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) study the relevance of
this type of shock for growth in the United States. Fisher (2006) documents an acceleration
in the decline in the relative price of investment since 1982 and evaluates the importance
of investment shocks for business cycles. Perhaps closest in spirit to our narrative, Krusell,
Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) study the evolution of the U.S. skill premium in a
model with price of investment shocks and CES production between skilled labor and capital
equipment.
2 Trends in Labor Shares and Investment Prices
We start by documenting the pervasive decline in labor shares around the world at the country,
U.S. state, and industry levels. Next, we document a decline in the relative price of investment
goods, which we later show to be the key factor explaining the global trend in the labor share.
Each subsection first describes the data sources used and then summarizes the relevant trends.
2.1 Declining Labor Shares
Our baseline results come from analysis of a new dataset we construct using country-level statis-
tics on labor share in the corporate sector. We generate these data by combining five broad
sources: (i) country-specific Internet web pages (such as that managed by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) for the United States); (ii) digital files obtained from the United Nations
(UN); (iii) digital files obtained from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD); (iv) physical books published by the UN; and (v) physical books published
by the OECD. Over time and across countries there are some di↵erences in methodologies, but
our data generally conform to System of National Accounts (SNA) standards.4
4To merge the data, we begin by using any values we are able to obtain from the Internet. This is our preferred
source as it is the most likely to include data revisions. We then rank the digital files by the number of available
years of data for each country and use these sources (in order) when the preferred sources lack data. Lastly, we
similarly rank and use the printed sources. We only connect series together from multiple sources if they satisfy
a “smooth pasting” condition whereby measures for any given variable from overlapping years for both sources
are su ciently close to each other. While there are some exceptions, this procedure typically implies that one or
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Economic activity is divided in the SNA into the corporate (C), household (H), and gov-
ernment (G) sectors. The household sector includes unincorporated businesses, sole propri-
etors, non-profits serving households, and the actual and imputed rental income accruing to
non-corporate owners of housing. The corporate sector includes financial and non-financial
corporations. Nominal GDP Y equals the sum of sectoral gross value added Q (final output
less intermediate consumption) and taxes net of subsidies on products:5
Y = QC +QH +QG + Taxproducts. (1)
The aggregate labor share equals total compensation of labor across all three sectors divided
by GDP, or WN/Y , where W equals the average wage and N equals hours worked. Corporate
gross value added QC equals the sum of compensation paid to labor WCNC , taxes net of
subsidies on production (including items such as corporate income and property taxes), and
gross operating surplus (including items such as interests on loans, retained earnings, and
dividend payments).
For most of our analyses, we focus on the labor share in the corporate sector, WCNC/QC .6
The labor share measured within the corporate sector is not impacted by the statistical im-
putation of wages from the combined capital and labor income earned by sole proprietors and
unincorporated enterprises, highlighted by Gollin (2002) as problematic for the consistent mea-
surement of the labor share. Additionally, we find the focus on the corporate labor share
theoretically appealing given di culties in specifying a production function and optimization
problem for the government.
For all our analyses, we start in 1975 and only include countries that have at least 15
two sources contribute the bulk of the data for any given country. These key sources do, however, di↵er across
countries. We refer the reader to the SNA Section of the United Nations Statistics Division and to Lequiller and
Blades (2006) for the most detailed descriptions of how national accounts are constructed and harmonized to meet
SNA standards.
5This is true for a large majority of countries but there are several exceptions. For example, BEA accounts for
the United States incorporate net taxes on products into the gross value added of each of the three sectors and
also include unincorporated enterprises in what they call the business sector (rather than in the household sector).
National accounts for Germany and China also include net taxes in sectoral gross value added.
6According to the SNA, compensation of employees includes wages and salaries in cash, wages and salaries
in kind, and employers’ social contributions for sickness, accidents, and retirement (to social security funds and
insurance enterprises). Though the treatment of gains associated with the exercise of stock options is subject to
data availability and is not uniform across countries, most developed countries try to account for the value of stock
options granted to employees as part of labor compensation (Lequiller, 2002).
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years of data. The resulting dataset contains corporate-sector-level information on the income
structure of 56 countries for various years between 1975 and 2012. This is a significant increase
in coverage relative to what is readily downloadable from the UN and OECD, but below we
also report similar results when only using those standard data sources.
The solid line in Figure 1 shows the evolution of the global corporate labor share in our data
by plotting the year fixed e↵ects from a least-squares regression of the corporate labor share
on country and year fixed e↵ects. The regression includes country fixed e↵ects to eliminate the
influence of countries entering and exiting our dataset. We weight observations by corporate
gross value added measured in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates. We normalize the fixed
e↵ects such that they equal the level of the corporate labor share in our dataset in 1975. From
a level of roughly 65 percent, the global corporate labor share has exhibited a relatively steady
downward trend, reaching about 60 percent at the end of the sample. The dashed line plots the
fixed e↵ects from an equivalent regression and shows that labor’s share of the overall economy
also declined globally.7 Unless otherwise noted, we refer to measures taken from the corporate
sector when referring to the labor share below.
Figure 2 shows that the decline in the labor share occurred in each of the four largest
economies in the world. The dashed lines plot linear trends estimated using all available data
since 1975. All four trends are downward sloping and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. In fact, most countries in the world experienced this decline. Figure 3 shows the slope of
these linear trends for all 56 countries with data available for at least 15 years. The coe cients
are scaled such that the units represent the percentage point change in the labor share every
10 years. 38 countries experienced labor share declines compared to 18 which experienced
increases. Of those 43 countries where the trends were statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, the labor share declined in 34 of them. The largest eight economies are shaded, and
with the United Kingdom as the only exception, they all experienced statistically significant
declines.
The decline in the global labor share reflects declines in the large majority of countries
7The level of overall labor share is about 10 percentage points lower than the corporate labor share in part
due to the inclusion of taxes in the denominator. There are a number of countries which lack the data required
to calculate the corporate labor share, but which have data on the overall labor share. In such cases, we use the
aggregate figures but scale them up by the average global ratio of corporate to overall labor share found in the
dataset.
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around the world and is not simply a reflection of trends in a few big countries. In fact,
even looking at regional data within the United States, we find that the decline is similarly
broad-based. We calculate the labor share for all U.S. states plus the District of Columbia by
dividing total compensation by value added in the BEA’s state-level GDP data (these data do
not isolate the corporate sector).8 In parallel to the country trends plotted in Figure 3, Figure
4 shows labor share declines in the majority of U.S. states with 34 states experiencing labor
share declines compared to 17 which experienced increases. Of those 38 states where the trends
were statistically significant at the 5 percent level, the labor share declined in 27 of them.
Returning to the global analysis, we now ask how much of the global labor share decline
reflects declines within industries and how much reflects changes in industrial composition.
For example, the labor share in manufacturing is typically higher than in finance and business
services. Does the decline in the labor share simply reflect the fact that manufacturing’s share
of economic activity has fallen while the share of economic activity in services has risen?
To answer this question, we use the EU KLEMS (KLEMS) dataset. It is available for far
fewer countries and does not allow for a focus on the corporate sector, but it does allow us to
construct labor shares for each country in commonly defined industries of varying granularity.9
Figure 5 plots labor share trends, scaled to equal the percentage point change per decade,
for 10 non-overlapping industries that aggregate to the overall economy. For each industry
we estimate a linear trend from a regression of the labor share that includes country fixed
e↵ects and weights countries by their value added. The labor share significantly declines in 6
of the 8 industries with statistically significant trends. The remaining two exhibit statistically
insignificant declines in their labor shares.
Finally, we more formally address the question of how much of the change in the labor
share is due to changing sizes of industries with di↵erent levels of labor shares and how much is
due to changes in labor shares within those industries. We write the standard within-between
8The data are available prior to and including 1997 using the SIC classification system and from 1997 onward
using the NAICS classification system. We match the 1997 values at the most disaggregated level and scale the
SIC values by the discrepancy. This e↵ectively shifts the earlier values of overall U.S. labor share up by about 1
percentage point and results in a continuous series which we then use.
9These data end in 2007, several years earlier than our baseline dataset. When we overlap the KLEMS data
with our dataset, we find that the country labor share trends are quite similar for the years in which both sources
exist. The correlation of country trends is over 90 percent if one excludes the two large outliers of Luxembourg
and Ireland.
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where !i,k denotes industry k’s share in country i’s value added, x̄ denotes the arithmetic mean
of the variable x, and  x denotes the estimated linear trend in x.
Figure 6 plots labor share trends, the left-hand side of equation (2), in the horizontal
axis against the within-industry component, the first term on the right-hand-side of equation
(2), in the vertical axis. With a few exceptions, countries in Figure 6 are aligned along the
45 degree line, implying that labor share declines are predominantly driven by the within-
industry component. Further, critical for our cross-sectional analyses below, cross-country
variation in labor share trends is largely explained by cross-country variation in the within-
industry component. When we add the within-industry component across all countries and
divide by the sum of the total components, we conclude that more than 90 percent of the labor
share decline reflects within-industry declines.10
The prominence of the within-industry component is also interesting as it rules out otherwise
plausible stories related to the increasing trade integration of China or globalization more
generally. For example, imagine a simple two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model with Cobb-
Douglas production in two sectors with di↵erent labor shares. Compared to autarky, the
relatively capital-abundant economy will in the free-trade equilibrium allocate a larger share
of its inputs to the production of the lower labor share industry. If we think of China as the
relatively labor-abundant economy opening up to trade, one might predict a decline in the rest
of the world’s labor share due to this mechanism. In addition to the fact that we document a
labor share decline in China itself, this trade-induced compositional change is unlikely to explain
the labor share decline in other countries because it counterfactually implies an important role
for the between component in equation (2).11
10This statistic will vary with the fineness of the industry definition. If we calculate this statistic using an
alternative decomposition available in KLEMS containing 23, rather than 10, industries, we attribute roughly 85
percent of the decline to the within-industry component.
11We calculated each country’s trends in imports, exports, and overall trade both bilaterally with China and
multilaterally, where the change in flows are expressed relative the country’s GDP. These measures of increasing
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2.2 Declining Prices of Investment Goods
In parallel with these large and broad trends in the labor share, the price of investment relative
to consumption goods has also experienced a pervasive decline. For our cross-country analyses,
we measure the relative price of investment goods in two datasets which o↵er di↵erent costs and
benefits. Our first source is the Penn World Tables (PWT, Mark 7.1), which o↵ers measures at a
point in time of the relative price levels of investment and consumption goods for many countries
around the world. The PWT data are translated using investment-specific and consumption-
specific purchasing power parity exchange rates, which is undesirable for our exercise because
we wish to know the price of investment relative to consumption that a domestic producer
faces. We therefore follow Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) and divide the PWT relative price of
investment of each country by the PWT relative price of investment in the United States. We
then multiply this ratio by the ratio of the investment price deflator to the personal consumption
expenditure deflator for the United States, obtained from the BEA. This procedure yields for
each country the relative price of investment measured at domestic prices.
The PWT data cover a large set of countries and in some cases extend back to 1950. Further,
by combining the PWT’s information on the cross-section of international prices with time-
series information on the relative price of investment from the United States, the constructed
series are insensitive to cross-country di↵erences in methodologies used to construct investment
price deflators. If the U.S. BEA employs hedonic adjustments to properly capture changes in the
quality of computers, for example, then our methodology will imply that this same adjustment
is implicitly captured for all countries in the data.
The solid line in Figure 7 plots year fixed e↵ects from a regression of the log relative price of
investment in the PWT dataset after absorbing country dummies. The regressions are weighted
by GDP and the fixed e↵ects are normalized to equal 0 in 1980. The series exhibits a mild
decline from 1950 to 1980, trending downward about 0.02 log point per decade. Consistent with
Fisher (2006), however, the series exhibits a clear break around 1980 and declines at a rate
closer to 0.1 log point per decade after 1980. This steep downward trend occurred all around
the world. Of the countries with at least 15 years of data on both the PWT relative price of
exposure to China and to the rest of the world do not generally correlate with declines in the labor share.
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investment and on labor shares, 42 experienced declines in the relative price of investment since
1975 compared to only 13 which experienced an increase.
As a second measure of the relative price of investment goods, we take the ratio in each coun-
try of the fixed investment deflator to the consumer price index, obtained from the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU). These data rely more on the individual statistical agencies in each
country but o↵er the benefit of properly capturing di↵erences in the composition of investment
spending across countries. The short-dashed line in Figure 7 plots the equivalent series of year
fixed e↵ects as the solid line but estimated using the EIU data, which is only available from
1980. The global trends are highly similar, with the decline in the relative price of investment
being slightly less steep in the EIU data. The decline in the EIU data is also widespread across
countries, with 38 experiencing declines compared to 15 with increases. There are di↵erences in
country and time coverage between the PWT and EIU sources, but when we consider overlap-
ping country-year observations, we measure a cross-country correlation of about 0.8 between
the trends found in the two datasets.
Finally, our industry-level analyses use KLEMS data on investment and output prices in
each industry. Though the key variation we will use from this dataset will be cross-industry
di↵erences in declines in the relative price of investment, we demonstrate comparability with
the other sources by plotting time fixed e↵ects from regressions using the country-level relative
price of investment in KLEMS. The long-dashed line in Figure 7 shows an increasing trend
which sharply reverses in the early 1980s, consistent with the timing of the decline captured in
the other data sources. All countries in KLEMS with su cient data for this analysis exhibit a
declining relative price of investment and the correlation of these trends with the trends found
in PWT and EIU across countries is nearly 0.6.
3 A Model of the Labor Share
We now develop a model that relates the labor share to the relative price of investment goods
as well as to other macroeconomic variables such as price markups and factor-augmenting
technology. We consider a two-sector economic environment in which final consumption and
investment goods are produced by combining intermediate inputs using a CES technology.
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Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite, t = 0, 1, 2, .... There is no uncertainty and all
economic agents have perfect foresight. All payments in this economy are made in terms of the
final consumption good, which is the numeraire.
3.1 Final Consumption Good
Competitive producers assemble the final consumption good Ct from a continuum of intermedi-












where ct(z) denotes the quantity of input z used in production of the final consumption good
and ✏t > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between input varieties. The consumption
good producers purchase these inputs at prices pt(z) from monopolistically competitive firms
that charge a markup over marginal cost that depends on ✏t. To capture changes in markups
over time, we allow the elasticity of substitution across varieties to vary over time.
Cost-minimization implies that the demand for input variety z for use in producing the
consumption good is ct(z) = (pt(z)/P ct )
 ✏t Ct. The final consumption good is the numeraire











3.2 Final Investment Good















The exogenous variable ⇠t denotes the technology level in the production of the consumption
good relative to the investment good. A decline of ⇠t implies an improvement in the technology
of producing the investment good relative to the consumption good.
Since firms in the final investment good sector are competitive, the price of the final invest-
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1 ✏t = ⇠t. We refer
to ⇠t = P xt /P
c
t as the relative price of investment, which declines whenever technology in the
investment good sector improves relative to the consumption good sector. Finally, demand for
input variety z for use in production of the investment good is given by xt(z) = ⇠tpt(z) ✏tXt.
3.3 Producers of Intermediate Inputs
The producer of intermediate input variety z operates a constant returns to scale technology
in capital and labor inputs to produce output sold to both consumption and investment good
producers, yt(z) = F (kt(z), nt(z)). Capital is rented at rate Rt and labor is rented at a price Wt
from the household. Producers of intermediate inputs take input prices and aggregate demand,
Yt = Ct + ⇠tXt, as given.
The profit-maximization problem of the producer of intermediate input z is:
max
pt(z),yt(z),kt(z),nt(z)
⇧t(z) = pt(z)yt(z) Rtkt(z) Wtnt(z), (6)
subject to:
yt(z) = ct(z) + xt(z) = pt(z)
 ✏t(Ct + ⇠tXt) = pt(z)
 ✏tYt. (7)
The first-order condition with respect to capital is pt(z)Fk,t(z) = µtRt and with respect to
labor is pt(z)Fn,t(z) = µtWt. Firms set the marginal revenue product of factors as a markup
µt = ✏t/ (✏t   1) over factor prices.
3.4 Household
The household derives utility from consumption goods and disutility from supplying labor. It
purchases consumption and investment goods from final good producers at prices one and ⇠t
respectively. The household uses the investment good to augment the physical capital stock
and rents capital to producers of intermediate goods at a rental rate Rt. The household owns
all firms in the economy and receives their profits as dividends in every period. The household
supplies labor to intermediate input producers at a wage Wt. It can also hold some asset Bt
that pays a real interest rate rt and is in zero net supply. Denoting by  t a household preference
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, the capital accumulation equation, Kt+1 = (1  
 )Kt +Xt, and the household budget constraint:




(Wtnt(z) +Rtkt(z) + ⇧t(z)) dz. (9)










Household optimization implies a standard Euler equation for consumption across time and
a standard intraperiod condition for leisure and consumption. Finally, the first-order condition
with respect to capital is given by:
Rt+1 = ⇠t (1 + rt+1)  ⇠t+1 (1   ) , (10)
where 1 + rt+1 = (1/ ) (VC(Ct, Nt)/VC(Ct+1, Nt+1)) denotes the gross real interest rate. This
condition says that the household invests in physical capital up to the point where the marginal
benefit of investing in capital (the rental rate) equals the marginal cost of investing in capital.
3.5 Equilibrium
We define an equilibrium for this economy as a sequence of prices and quantities such that,
given a sequence of exogenous variables: (i) the household maximizes its utility; (ii) final
producers of the consumption good minimize their costs; (iii) final producers of the investment
good minimize their costs; (iv) each producer of input variety z maximizes profits; and (v)
markets for labor, capital, assets, consumption, investment, and intermediate inputs clear in
every date. We define a steady state as an equilibrium in which all variables are constant over
time.
The equilibrium of the model is symmetric, with pt(z) = P ct = 1, kt(z) = Kt, nt(z) = Nt,
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ct(z) = Ct, xt(z) = ⇠tXt, yt(z) = Yt = Ct + ⇠tXt, and Yt = F (Kt, Nt), where Nt and Kt are
total labor and total capital. The share of income paid as wages for labor services, rentals for
































where sL,t + sK,t + s⇧,t = 1.
3.6 The Production Function
We assume intermediate inputs are produced with a CES production function:










where   denotes the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in production and
↵k is a distribution parameter. We let AK,t and AN,t denote capital-augmenting and labor-
augmenting technology respectively. The limit of the CES production function as   approaches
1 is the Cobb-Douglas production function, F (Kt, Nt) = (AK,tKt)
↵k (AN,tNt)
1 ↵k . With the





















3.7 The Labor Share
We can now discuss the determinants of the labor share of income sL,t. Using the first-order
condition for capital in equation (15) and the definitions of the income shares in equations
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(11)-(13), we derive an expression that relates the labor share to markups, capital-augmenting
technology, and the rental rate of capital for some value of the elasticity of substitution   and
the distribution parameter ↵k:






In the limiting case of a Cobb-Douglas production function where   = 1, the labor share of
income simply becomes sL,t = (1 ↵k)/µt. Therefore, with Cobb-Douglas production the labor
share of income varies over time only when markups vary over time and the labor share of cost,
sL,tµt = WtNt/(WtNt +RtKt), is constant.
As we discuss below, our estimation strategy focuses on labor share trends as this allows us
to control for substantial cross-country heterogeneity both in economic parameters (e.g. initial
level of technology) and in measurement practices. We write equation (17) in changes between
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where Ẑ = Zs/Zt   1 denotes the percent change of some variable Z between periods t and
s and where for notational convenience we drop subscripts from values corresponding to the
initial period t.
For any value of the elasticity of substitution  , given initial conditions for the labor share
sL and markups µ, equation (18) implies that information on changes in markups µ̂, in capital-
augmenting technology ÂK , and in the rental rate of capital R̂ is su cient to pin down changes
in the labor share ŝL. Additional knowledge of wage and labor-augmenting technology is not
informative for understanding changes in the labor share.
We derive (18) from the first-order condition with respect to capital, equation (15), rather
than the first-order condition with respect to labor, equation (16). We choose this approach
because we estimate equation (18) using long-run trends spanning 15 to 37 years of data and
treat these trends as steady state to steady state transitions. In steady state, equation (10)
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for capital becomes R = ⇠ (1/    1 +  ). Assuming constant discount factors   and constant
depreciation rates   over time (but not necessarily across countries), this allows us to directly
equate the growth in the rental rate of capital to the growth in the relative price of investment,
R̂ = ⇠̂. Internationally comparable and high quality data on ⇠̂ is more readily available than
data on wage growth.
To summarize, holding fixed the discount factor and the depreciation rate of capital, the
labor share will only change in the steady state of our model if AK , µ, or ⇠ change. This
general result argues against the relevance for the long-run decline in labor share of a large
set of factors such as wage markups, labor income taxes and other labor supply shocks, and
government spending shocks that do not directly a↵ect the production function.12
4 The Elasticity of Substitution
In this section we confront equation (18) with our data to estimate the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor  . We start by focusing only on trends in the relative price of
investment and abstract from markups and capital-augmenting technological progress because
we lack direct measurements on them. Next, we introduce assumptions that allow us to impute
time-varying markups from data on investment spending and we quantify the sensitivity of our
estimates to capital-augmenting technological progress. Finally, we estimate   with production
functions that allow for di↵erential substitutability between capital and two types of labor.
Equipped with our estimates of  , in Section 5 we quantify the e↵ect of the decline in the
relative price of investment goods on the labor share and explore the broader macroeconomic
and welfare implications of our findings.
We measure the percent change of all variables (corresponding to our “hat” notation) as
the linear trend in the log of the variable using all available data. We replace the variables
in levels with their average values in our sample. As discussed above, we focus on long-run
trends and below will think of them as capturing movements from an initial to a final steady
12For this reason our model abstracts from wage markups, labor income taxes, and household shocks to the utility
of leisure relative to consumption. All these factors are isomorphic to a change in   in household preferences in the
sense that none can a↵ect the labor share of income, the capital-to-labor ratio, and the wage in the steady state
of the model. Steady state wages do not depend on   because with constant returns to scale the de-accumulation
of capital implies a shift in labor demand that exactly o↵sets any shifts in labor supply.
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state. Assuming a constant household discount factor   and depreciation rate  , this allows
us to substitute the percent change across steady states in the rental rate of capital with the
percent change in the relative price of investment goods, R̂ = ⇠̂. However, we also show that
our results are robust when we allow for trends in depreciation rates.
4.1 Relative Price of Investment
We start with equation (18) and set µ = 1, µ̂ = 0, and ÂK = 0. We take a linear approximation




ŝL,j =   + (    1) ⇠̂j + uj , (19)
where j denotes observations. The intuition behind equation (19) is simple. Absent economic
profits and capital-augmenting technology growth, a positive relationship between trends in
the relative price of investment ⇠̂j and trends in the labor share ŝL,j is possible only when the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor   exceeds one. In that case, a decrease of
the cost of capital due to decreases in the relative price of investment induces firms to substitute
away from labor and toward capital to such an extent that it drives down the labor share. If
trends in the relative price of investment were unrelated to trends in the labor share this would
imply a Cobb-Douglas production function with   = 1. A negative relationship between trends
in the relative price of investment and trends in the labor share would imply   < 1.
We emphasize that the identification of   in equation (19) comes from the cross-sectional
variation of trends in labor shares and trends in the price of investment. Specifically, adding
a constant   to the regression allows us to control for global factors that a↵ect all countries.
For example, imagine that all countries experienced declining trends both in labor shares and
in the price of investment goods, but the extent of the labor share decline across countries was
unrelated to the extent of the decline in the price of investment across countries. In such a case,
we would estimate   = 1. Put di↵erently, even though both the labor share and the relative
price of investment declined over time for the typical country in our sample, our estimation
using cross-sectional variation could hypothetically produce an elasticity estimate less than one.
In this sense, our methodology for estimating the elasticity does not incorporate information
19
from the global trend that we hope to explain.
Given the small number of observations, estimation of equation (19) is particularly sensitive
to outliers. We standardize our selection and treatment of outliers by generating “robust
regression” estimates, which place less weight on extreme values that are identified endogenously
during the estimation.13 In practice, the primary di↵erence compared with OLS estimates for
most of our results is that the robust regressions endogenously assign very little weight to
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Niger.
Table 1 presents our baseline estimates of   from equation (19). In the first four rows we
estimate   using our country dataset, with j indexing the country observations. The first two
rows under the column labeled “Labor Share” list the source as “KN Merged” to refer to our
full dataset described above and rows (iii)-(iv) list the source as “OECD and UN” to refer to a
similarly constructed dataset which only uses data easily downloadable online from the UN and
OECD (i.e. it discards the data we collected ourselves from country-specific Internet sources
and physical books). The column labeled “Investment Price” alternates in these rows between
PWT and EIU to indicate the data source used for ⇠̂. These first four specifications produce
highly similar results, with the estimated   always being greater than 1.
To visualize these results, we plot in Figure 8 the cross-country relationship between the
left-hand side of equation (19) and the trends in the price of investment goods.14 We use the
“KN Merged” dataset for the labor share, the PWT for the price of investment goods, and
drop the three outliers discussed above to ensure that the plotted least-squares line closely
corresponds to the estimate presented in the first row of Table 1. Countries with larger relative
price of investment declines also experienced larger labor share declines, which results in a
statistically significant positive slope of 0.30 and an implied elasticity of 1.30.
13This regression is implemented with the command rreg in the statistical package STATA. The idea behind a
robust regression is to weight less observations which lie further from the regression line. The method starts by
dropping observations with Cook’s distance greater than one. Then an iterative process calculates weights based
on absolute residuals. The process stops when the maximum change between the weights from one iteration to
the next is below some tolerance level. All regressions reported in this paper use this procedure.
14In our closed economy model, the variation in the relative price of investment across countries is tied to
di↵erent sectoral productivity shocks in each country. This intuition can be extended to the open economy if one
thinks of investment goods as freely tradable across countries and consumption goods as being at least partly non-
tradable. As in Balassa-Samuelson, prices of investment goods would be equalized across countries but di↵erential
technology growth in traded relative to non-traded sectors will shift the price of investment relative to consumption
in each country. Aside from productivity shocks, cross-country di↵erences in the relative price of investment may
also come from di↵erences in the scale and timing of reductions in tari↵s and other trade frictions.
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In the last two rows of the table, we estimate   using the KLEMS dataset, with j indexing
country-industry observations for 10 major industries and 14 developed economies. We include
both country and industry fixed e↵ects in the regression. Unfortunately, we cannot isolate the
corporate labor share in the KLEMS data but we can measure the labor share in two alternative
ways, which we label as “KLEMS 1” and “KLEMS 2.”15 As shown in rows (v) and (vi) of
Table 1, both elasticity estimates from these data are also significantly greater than 1.
Our estimates allow for substantial heterogeneity across countries and industries. Initial
di↵erences in technology, wages, relative prices of investment, preferences, and depreciation
rates are all captured by the initial level of the labor share sL,j , which is allowed to vary across
observations in the left-hand side of equation (19). If our trends capture a steady state to
steady state transition, and assuming constant discount factor and depreciation rates over time
(but not necessarily across countries), our estimates of   allow for di↵erences in the growth of
wages, labor-augmenting technology, and anything other than capital-augmenting technology
and markups, which we address below. The only substantial restriction we are imposing is a
common elasticity of substitution   between capital and labor across countries or industries.16
Up to now our analysis imposes constant depreciation rates over time. We note that if
industries or countries which experienced larger declines in their relative price of investment
are systematically shifting the composition of their capital stock towards capital goods with
higher depreciation rates (e.g. computers), then our estimated   is generally biased downward.
This is because a given labor share decline would be associated with smaller declines in the
rental rate of capital, therefore increasing the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor necessary to generate the positive relationship between labor share trends and trends in
15In KLEMS 1 the labor share at the country-industry level is defined as compensation of employees divided by
gross value added, whereas in KLEMS 2 the labor share is defined as labor compensation divided by gross value
added. Labor compensation equals compensation of employees plus a fraction of other taxes on production and an
imputation for the income of self-employed using the category operating surplus / mixed income. Our preferred
notion of corporate labor compensation falls in between these two as it includes other taxes on production but
excludes the self-employed income imputation. The results reported in Section 2.1 use the KLEMS 1 definition of
the labor share. They are qualitatively similar if we use KLEMS 2.
16This restriction is tied to our strategy of using cross-sectional variation to identify  . We prefer using cross-
sectional variation as it eliminates the influence of global trends, but to check the robustness of our results, we have
also estimated country or country-industry specific  ’s based on long-term time-series variation. We generate an
estimate  ̃j for each observation by dividing the left-hand side of equation (19) by the right-hand side of equation




. The median elasticity
estimate across countries is close to our baseline value of 1.25.
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the rental rate.17
We empirically assess the extent of this bias in the KLEMS dataset because it includes
estimates of depreciation and capital stocks at the country-industry level. We modify the
expression for the rental rate by adding a subscript to the depreciation rate, Rj = ⇠j(1/   1+
 j), which means we can no longer equate growth in the rental rate with growth in the relative
price of investment. We assume   = 1/(1 + 0.10), measure  j and  ̂j in the KLEMS data,
and calculate alternative values for R̂j . Our estimated elasticity does not change meaningfully.
The values in rows (v) and (vi) of Table 1, 1.17 and 1.49, increase to 1.19 and 1.51 respectively
when taking into account heterogeneous and time-varying depreciation rates.
To summarize, our six baseline estimates of   average roughly 1.25 and are all statistically
di↵erent from one at the 5 percent significance level. Section 5 analyzes in greater detail the
implications of this value. Here we note that using   = 1.25 together with calibrated global
values for sL and ⇠̂ as inputs in equation (19) implies that roughly half of the global decline in
the labor share is explained by the decline in the relative price of investment.
4.2 Markups
We now allow for the possibility that our estimated elasticity is impacted by markups µj . Since
the labor, capital, and profit shares add up to one, measures of µj and µ̂j can be obtained with
the additional knowledge of capital share levels sK,j and changes ŝK,j. Under the assumption
that the trends we are interested in reflect movements from one steady state to another, and
holding constant the discount factor   and depreciation   over time, we can simply calculate
the trend in the capital share as the trend in the nominal investment rate, ŝK,j = \(RjKj/Yj) =
\(⇠jXj/Yj). We calculate the level of the capital share from the steady state condition sK,j =h⇣
1




[⇠jXj/Yj ] using data on the average nominal investment rate of countries in
the sample and assuming homogeneous discount factors and depreciation rates.18 We then use
17This argument assumes that the increase of depreciation does not more than o↵set the decline in the price of
investment, which is empirically true for the great majority of observations.
18We set   as above and let   = 0.10. The average initial profit share varies across data sources but generally is
less than 5 percent. For some countries this methodology implies negative profit shares. We have considered various
ad hoc treatments for such observations that bound profit shares above zero. Results vary slightly depending on
the methodology, but consistently produce average estimates of   that are close to our baseline estimates. We only
do this analysis at the country level because when applied to the more disaggregated industry data, our procedure
often imputes implausibly large capital shares.
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µj = 1/(sL,j + sK,j) to calculate the levels and changes in markups.
As a simple example of how markups could bias our elasticity estimates from Section 4.1,
consider the Cobb-Douglas case which has an elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor equal to one. Though the labor share of costs is constant, markups generate a wedge
between costs and revenues and can cause movements in the labor share of income. If markups
increased more in countries with larger declines in the relative price of investment, then labor
shares would decline more in these countries. Without taking into account markup variation,
our baseline procedure would incorrectly estimate an elasticity greater than one.
Using our estimated trends in capital shares, we can rule out this possibility. If the true
elasticity is one and markup growth drives all labor share movements, then labor and capital
shares of income change by the same percent. Figure 9 plots the percent change in labor
shares against the percent change in capital shares. Countries do not lie along the 45 degree
line. Rather, the best-fit line has essentially zero slope. This finding provides strong evidence
against the possibility that we estimate a non-unitary elasticity purely due to the bias from
markups.
To more generally assess the impact of markups on our elasticity estimate, we derive a
modified estimating equation. We continue to assume no capital-augmenting technological
progress and set ÂK = 0 in equation (18). Taking a linear approximation around ⇠̂ = 0 and









+ uj . (20)
Table 2 reports our estimates of   from equation (20). As before, we report values across
multiple data sources on the labor share and the relative price of investment, but here we
additionally report whether we use total or corporate nominal investment data in construct-
ing markups. We consider these estimates less reliable than our baseline estimates as they
require richer assumptions and make use of imputed values as opposed to direct measurements.
Nonetheless, our results in Table 2 are highly similar to our baseline results in Table 1.
The similarity in our estimated   when including or excluding information on markups
does not imply that markups played no role in labor share movements. In fact, since we
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do not generally find significant increases in capital shares, it must be the case that some of
labor share’s decline is attributable to markup growth. Given that our elasticity estimates
remain unchanged, however, we maintain our conclusion that the decline in the relative price
of investment explains roughly half of the labor share decline.
4.3 Capital-Augmenting Technological Progress
Given the di culty of properly measuring capital-augmenting technology growth, our baseline
analysis assumed that it is orthogonal to changes in the relative price of investment.19 In this
section, we gauge how large a bias this assumption could plausibly create. We conclude that
while the cross-country pattern of capital-augmenting technology change may bias upward our
elasticity estimates, the bias is unlikely to be quantitatively large.




ŝL,j =   + (    1) ⇠̂j + (1   ) ÂK,j + uj . (21)
Let  ̂ denote our estimate of the elasticity of substitution when omitting capital-augmenting
technology growth from the regression and let   denote the true elasticity of substitution. Then
the bias is given by:















denotes the correlation between capital-augmenting technology growth and









standard deviations, in the cross section of countries. The bias tends to zero as the true
elasticity   approaches one.
Consider the possibility that countries that experienced the greatest declines in their rela-
tive prices of investment also experienced the highest capital-augmenting technology growth,
19Many estimates of capital-augmenting technology come from equation (18) which can be used to infer ÂK
assuming no profits and a given value of the elasticity of substitution. Given that we estimate the elasticity and






< 0.20 Equation (22) shows that if the true elasticity of substitution is greater
than one, then our estimate is upward biased ( ̂ >  ). If the true elasticity is lower than one,
then our estimate is downward biased. This logic implies that the bias from capital-augmenting
technology growth would never cause us to mistakenly estimate an elasticity of substitution  
that exceeds one if the true elasticity was smaller than one.
To quantify the size of the bias using equation (22), we need to specify values for the standard
deviations of the relative price of investment and capital-augmenting technology growth and
for the correlation between these two variables. To get a sense for these moments, we combine
our PWT and EIU data on ⇠̂ with with cross-country estimates of TFP growth that we use as
proxies for capital-augmenting technology growth ÂK .21 While imperfect, this is a reasonable
exercise as ÂK is the product of capital-augmenting and Hicks-neutral technology growth. We
estimate corr(ÂK , ⇠̂) = 0.23, sd(ÂK) = 0.093 and sd(⇠̂) = 0.120.
Given these values, and given our estimate  ̂ = 1.25, equation (22) implies a true elasticity
of   = 1.21. We conclude that the upward bias from capital-augmenting technology growth
is small and unlikely to alter our conclusions. With alternative estimates of the covariance
between ÂK and ⇠̂, one can use equation (22) to obtain di↵erent magnitudes of the bias.
For the results to di↵er significantly from ours, however, the cross-country pattern of capital-
augmenting technology growth would need to be significantly di↵erent than the pattern in these
estimates of TFP growth.
4.4 Skilled vs. Unskilled Labor
Our analyses thus far assume that all labor types are equally substitutable with capital. Influ-
ential work such as Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), however, has suggested
the importance of the di↵erential substitutability of capital with di↵erent types of skill. Addi-
tionally, there have been significant trends in recent decades in the skill composition of the labor
force related to changing skill premia, specialization, and international trade. We use KLEMS
20We emphasize this possibility as we find it far more plausible than the alternative in which countries experi-
encing the greatest declines in the price of investment have the slowest capital-augmenting technology growth.
21We use TFP estimates from The Conference Board’s Total Economy Database, which are available from 1990-
2012 for about 50 countries overlapping with our dataset. The estimated moments account for the existence of
outliers and represent averages between the PWT and the EIU datasets.
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data to evaluate whether changes in the skill composition of the labor force in a production
function with di↵erential capital-skill substitutability alter our conclusion that the decline in
the relative price of investment goods accounts for half of the decline in the global labor share.
We maintain the assumption of a homogeneous capital stockKt but now distinguish between
two types of labor, skilled St and unskilled Ut. Within the CES framework, there are three ways
in which skilled labor, unskilled labor, and the capital stock can be nested. The first way is as
in the production function (14), in which the aggregate labor input is a function of di↵erent
skills, Nt = Nt(St, Ut), and Nt and the capital stock Kt combine with a constant elasticity of
substitution  . In this case all our previous results continue to apply.




























where ⇢ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor and   is the elasticity
of those factors with unskilled labor. We follow the same steps as in the two-factor case to
derive the corresponding estimating equation:
sL,j
1  sL,j




+ uj , (24)
where we continue to define the labor share as the sum of all compensation to all labor types.
The term \Sj/Kj denotes the change in the ratio of skilled labor to capital. The third way to nest
the three inputs is to reverse the structure in (23), with capital and unskilled labor combining
with each other with an elasticity of substitution ⇢ and the combined input aggregating with
skilled labor with an elasticity  . This alternative production function leads to an identical
estimating equation as (24), but with “Sj” replaced by “Uj”.
We estimate   for both of these nesting structures using the KLEMS industry data, where
the change in either skilled or unskilled labor relative to capital is added as a covariate. We con-
sider two definitions of unskilled labor, one that includes KLEMS’ definitions of both “middle”
and “low” skill and the other just using “low.” As with the previous industry-level estimates,
we use both KLEMS definitions of the labor share and include industry and country fixed ef-
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fects. Table 3 presents our estimates. Across the six specifications, the estimates for   average
1.26, the same as our benchmark value. In all cases, the estimated   is significantly di↵erent
from one at the 10 percent level.
As with the case of markups, the similarity in our estimated   when including or excluding
the possibility of capital-skill complementarity does not imply that changes in the stock of skill
played no role in labor share movements.22 Rather, the results in Table 3 simply confirm that
even with these alternative production functions and taking into account the changing skill
composition of labor, the decline in the relative price of investment continues to account on its
own for about half of the labor share decline.
5 The Decline in the Labor Share
Figure 1 documented a 5 percentage point global decline in the labor share. Figure 7 docu-
mented a global decline in the relative price of investment goods of about 25 percent. Using
cross-country variation, we estimated an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor of
about 1.25. This estimate proves stable when we take into account markup variation, capital-
augmenting technology growth, and changes in the skill composition of the labor force. Using
this elasticity estimate and setting the global labor share to the average level in our sample, we
find that the 25 percent negative shock to the relative price of investment generates roughly
half of the decline in the global labor share.
Our estimates of the elasticity  , markup growth µ̂, and the shock in the relative price of
investment ⇠̂ have additional implications for other macroeconomic aggregates and for welfare.
In this section, we solve for the general equilibrium of our model in order to consider the
broader importance of our findings. We highlight that the implications of our explanation of
the decline in labor share can di↵er starkly from those of alternative explanations.
To assess the impact of our estimated elasticity we calibrate two economies, one with CES
production and   = 1.25 and the other an otherwise identical economy but with Cobb-Douglas
22Depending on the specification, the coe cients on [S/K or [U/K suggest that skill composition may in fact
have played some role in the declining labor share. The coe cient on these covariates is a function of the two
elasticities   and ⇢, the level of S/K or U/K, and the distribution parameter  2. So this regression alone cannot
be used to identify the value of ⇢.
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production (i.e.   = 1).23 The first two columns of Table 4 report the results when we introduce
into the Cobb-Douglas and CES economies a 25 percent negative shock to the relative price of
investment. All changes in the table are across steady states.24
The first three rows show the percentage point change in factor shares. As expected, the
⇠̂ shock has no impact on the labor share in the Cobb-Douglas economy while it generates a
2.6 percentage point decline in the CES economy. Given that markups do not change, the
decline in the CES case is associated with an equal percentage point increase in the capital
share. In addition to the implications for labor share, a comparison of these first two columns
reveals important di↵erences for output and welfare in the economies’ responses to the shock.
Given the greater substitutability between capital and labor, the CES economy adjusts more
to the lower cost of capital, resulting in a larger increase in the capital-to-labor ratio than in
the Cobb-Douglas economy. This implies that in response to the same decline in the price of
investment, the CES economy experiences higher GDP, consumption, and investment growth.
Welfare, in terms of equivalent consumption units, increases by 22 percent, or 4 percentage
points, more in the CES economy relative to the Cobb-Douglas economy.
Columns three and four evaluate the response of the two economies to a markup shock
which increases the profit share from an initial level of 3 percent to a final level of 8 percent
while holding ⇠ constant. Broadly in line with our results from Section 4.2, we choose the scale
of this markup shock in order to generate an identical decline in the labor share as generated
by the ⇠̂ shock in the CES case. In the Cobb-Douglas case, consistent with the logic presented
earlier, the labor and capital shares decline by an equal percent (the values in rows (i) and (ii)
are not equal as they are in percentage points). Comparing the second and fourth columns, we
conclude that alternative explanations for an equal decline in the labor share entail di↵erent
macroeconomic implications. If labor share declines result from declines in the relative price of
investment with CES production, they are associated with significant output and welfare gains.
23Period utility is given by Vt = log(Ct)  (1/2)N2t . We normalize the relative price of investment goods in the
initial steady state to ⇠ = 1 and set the depreciation rate at 10 percent to target a steady state investment rate
of 20 percent. We set the discount factor as before to   = 1/(1 + 0.10). Finally, we choose ↵k in the production
function (14) to target a 60 percent steady state labor share. By appropriately normalizing the levels of Hicks-
neutral technology separately for the CES production function and for the Cobb-Douglas production function, the
two economies share exactly the same initial steady state in all other variables.
24Here we explore the long-run implications of changes in the labor share. Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis
(2010) discuss the implications of variable labor shares for business cycle fluctuations.
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In contrast, labor share declines associated with markup increases in fact reduce welfare.
Columns five and six then consider the simultaneous introduction of both a decline in the
relative price of investment and an increase in markups. In the CES case, these shocks together
can produce the entire 5 percentage point decline in the labor share. The changes in output
and welfare in the case with both shocks, however, far more closely resemble the outcomes
with only the ⇠̂ shock than those with only the µ̂ shock. Markups may be of roughly equal
importance as the relative price of investment for explaining the total global labor share decline,
but this evidence suggests that the component attributable to the markup shock had far less
important macroeconomic implications than the component attributable to the decline in the
relative price of investment.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we do three things. We document a decline in the global labor share over the
past 35 years, o↵er an explanation for the decline, and assess the resulting macroeconomic
implications. We start by showing that the share of income accruing to labor has declined in
the large majority of countries and industries. Larger labor share declines occurred in countries
or industries with larger declines in their relative price of investment goods. Next, we use this
cross-sectional variation to estimate the shape of the production function and conclude that
the decline in the relative price of investment explains roughly half of the decline in the global
labor share. Finally, we explore the macroeconomic and welfare implications of our results. We
emphasize that our explanation for the labor share decline carries with it significantly di↵erent
implications from alternative explanations.
Our conclusions suggest several paths for future research. For example, our results imply
meaningful changes in the distribution of income when households have heterogeneous assets
or when skills are di↵erentially substitutable with capital and can accumulate endogenously.
Further, as labor shares have declined, business earnings and corporate saving have increased.
This large change in the flow of funds between households and firms may have important
macroeconomic repercussions.25
25See Karabarbounis and Neiman (2012) for documentation of this global increase in saving by the corporate
29
Lastly, our results support the view that changes in technology, likely associated with the
computer and information technology age, are key factors in understanding long-term changes
in factor shares. This raises natural questions. What will be the future path of the relative
price of investment? Will the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor change over
time? Standard macroeconomic models do not allow for long-term trends in labor shares, a
strong prediction which we show to be violated in the data since the early 1980s. We hope our
results generate new frameworks and analyses useful for thinking about these future trends.
sector and for a model in which the sectoral distribution of saving matters for macroeconomic allocations.
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Figure 1: Declining Global Labor Share
Notes: The figure shows year fixed e↵ects from a regression of corporate and overall labor shares that also include country fixed e↵ects
to account for entry and exit during the sample. The regressions are weighted by corporate gross value added and GDP measured in
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Figure 2: Declining Labor Share for the Largest Countries

















































Figure 3: Estimated Trends in Country Labor Shares
Notes: The figure shows estimated trends in the labor share for all countries in our dataset with at least 15 years of data starting in
1975. Trend coe cients are reported in units per 10 years (i.e. a value of -5 means a 5 percentage point decline every 10 years). The























































































Figure 4: Estimated Trends in U.S. State Labor Shares
Notes: The figure shows estimated trends in the labor share for 51 U.S. states plus District of Columbia in BEA data starting in 1975.





























































































Figure 5: Estimated Trends in Industry Labor Shares
Notes: The figure shows estimated trends in the labor share for 10 non-overlapping industries in the KLEMS data starting in 1975.
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Figure 6: Within Component and Total Trends in Country Labor Shares
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Figure 7: Declining Global Price of Investment Goods
Notes: The figure shows year fixed e↵ects from regressions of the log relative price of investment that absorb country fixed e↵ects to
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Trend in Log Relative Price of Investment
Figure 8: Labor Share and Relative Price of Investment
Notes: The figure plots the left-hand side and the right-hand side of equation (19). All values are scaled to denote changes per 10
years. For example, a value of -10 for the trend in the log relative price of investment means a roughly 10 percent decline of the price
every 10 years. The figure excludes three countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Niger) with extremely low weights in the baseline
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Trend in Log Labor Share
Figure 9: Capital Share and Labor Share
Notes: The figure plots the trend in the log capital share against the trend in the log labor share. All values are scaled to denote
percent changes per 10 years. For example, a value of -10 for the trend in the log labor share means a 10 percent decline of the
labor share every 10 years. For illustrative reasons, in this figure we drop three observations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Macao)
with extremely low weights in the regression of the first row of Table 2 and we winsorize one observation in each dimension for both
variables. The solid line represents the fitted relationship between trends in capital share and trends in the labor share (slope 0.22
with a standard error of 0.23), whereas the dashed line represents the 45 degree line.
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Labor Share Investment Price  ̂ Std. Error 90% Conf. Interval Obs.
(i) KN Merged PWT 1.26 0.08 [1.12,1.40] 55
(ii) KN Merged EIU 1.21 0.07 [1.10,1.32] 53
(iii) OECD and UN PWT 1.25 0.08 [1.12,1.39] 48
(iv) OECD and UN EIU 1.16 0.06 [1.06,1.26] 46
(v) KLEMS 1 KLEMS 1.17 0.06 [1.06,1.27] 129
(vi) KLEMS 2 KLEMS 1.49 0.13 [1.29,1.70] 129
Average 1.26
Table 1: Baseline Estimates of Elasticity of Substitution
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Labor Share Investment Price Investment Rate  ̂ Std. Error 90% Conf. Interval Obs.
(i) KN Merged PWT Total 1.17 0.10 [1.00,1.35] 52
(ii) KN Merged PWT Corporate 1.02 0.09 [0.86,1.17] 53
(iii) KN Merged EIU Total 1.22 0.09 [1.07,1.35] 51
(iv) KN Merged EIU Corporate 1.28 0.09 [1.13,1.43] 52
(v) OECD and UN PWT Total 1.24 0.10 [1.07,1.41] 44
(vi) OECD and UN PWT Corporate 1.21 0.11 [1.02,1.39] 44
(vii) OECD and UN EIU Total 1.21 0.09 [1.07,1.35] 43
(viii) OECD and UN EIU Corporate 1.32 0.10 [1.16,1.49] 43
Average 1.21
Table 2: Estimates of Elasticity of Substitution Allowing for Markups
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Labor Share Nested Input with Capital  ̂ Std. Error 90% Conf. Interval Obs.
(i) KLEMS 1 High Skill 1.23 0.08 [1.11,1.36] 100
(ii) KLEMS 1 Middle and Low Skill 1.19 0.08 [1.05,1.33] 100
(iii) KLEMS 1 Low Skill 1.19 0.09 [1.04,1.34] 100
(iv) KLEMS 2 High Skill 1.34 0.16 [1.07,1.60] 100
(v) KLEMS 2 Middle and Low Skill 1.31 0.17 [1.03,1.60] 100
(vi) KLEMS 2 Low Skill 1.31 0.18 [1.02,1.61] 100
Average 1.26
Table 3: Estimates of Elasticity of Substitution with Di↵erent Production Functions
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CD CES CD CES CD CES
⇠̂ ⇠̂ µ̂ µ̂ (⇠̂, µ̂) (⇠̂, µ̂)
(i) Labor Share (Percentage Points) 0.0 -2.6 -3.1 -2.6 -3.1 -4.9
(ii) Capital Share (Percentage Points) 0.0 2.6 -1.9 -2.4 -1.9 -0.1
(iii) Profit Share (Percentage Points) 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
(iv) Consumption 18.1 20.1 -5.2 -5.4 10.7 12.4
(v) Nominal Investment 18.1 30.8 -11.1 -12.7 3.7 11.9
(vi) Labor Input 0.0 -1.4 -3.2 -2.9 -3.2 -4.2
(vii) Capital Input 51.6 67.8 -11.1 -12.7 33.2 43.6
(viii) Output 18.1 22.8 -6.3 -6.8 9.4 12.3
(ix) Wage 18.1 19.2 -8.2 -8.2 7.1 7.7
(x) Rental Rate -22.1 -22.1 0.0 0.0 -22.1 -22.1
(xi) Capital-to-Output 28.4 36.6 -5.2 -6.4 21.8 27.9
(xii) Welfare Equivalent Consumption 18.1 22.1 -3.0 -3.4 13.2 15.8
Table 4: Evaluating Labor Share’s Decline (Percent Changes Across Steady States)
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